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Congress created 180-day exclusivity for generic drug applicants in the 1984
Hatch-Waxman amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA)' and amended it substantially in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Im-
provement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA).2 The core concept of this
exclusivity as it has been applied by FDA and the courts is that the first generic drug
applicant to challenge an innovator's patent is entitled to six months of exclusivity
against subsequent patent challengers for the same innovator drug. The 180-day
exclusivity provision is governed by sections 505(j)(5)(B)(iv) and 505(j)(5)(D) of the
FDCA, and it is intended to encourage generic applicants to challenge innovator
patents. Although the basic idea is simple and the language enacted in 1984 was
correspondingly brief, over the years the provision has given rise to a substantial
number of interpretive disputes, both at the agency and in the courts. The courts
are still grappling with interpretation of the 1984 provision, and it is already ap-
parent that the amended language will trigger additional disputes.
An earlier article in this journal traced the history of the 180-day exclusivity
provision from 1984 through its amendment in 2003 and court cases in 2004.1 This
article updates the earlier piece through the end of 2006 but is arranged by issue
rather than in a chronology. Part II presents the original and amended statutory
language. For the most part, the amended language applies only to abbreviated new
drug applications (ANDAs) filed after December 8, 2003, provided there was no
paragraph IV certification to the reference drug prior to that date. We refer to these
as "new ANDAs" and to all other ANDAs as "old ANDAs." Part III presents the
interpretive issues that have been addressed by FDA and/or the courts and describes
their resolution with respect to old ANDAs and, where different, new ANDAs.4
II. STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND EFFECTIVE DATES
A. Original Statutory Language
Between 1984 and 2003, section 505(j)(5)(B)(iv) of the FDCA provided that "[i]f
the [abbreviated new drug] application contains a certification described in subclause
* Ms. Lietzan is a Partner in the law firm of Covington & Burling LLP, Washington, DC. The
views expressed in this article are her own.
.. Mr. Korn is Assistant General Counsel at the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA), Washington, DC. The opinions expressed in this article are his own
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (1984).
2 Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
3 Erika Lietzan, A Brief History of 180-Day Exclusivity under the Hatch- Waxman Amendments,
59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 287 (2004). A subsequent update traced developments in 2004. Erika Lietzan,
2004 Update-180-Day Exclusivity Under the Hatch- Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 459 (2004).
4 The earlier article identified the cases by party and roman numeral (e.g., Purepac 1, Purepac II,
Mylan I, Mylan II). The growing number of disputes involving the same companies has rendered this
system unwieldy. Where shorthand is called for, we generally refer to the case by the active ingredient
of the innovator's drug.
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(IV) of paragraph (2)(A)(vii) [otherwise known as a "paragraph IV certification"]
and is for a drug for which a previous application has been submitted under this
subsection continuing [sic "containing"] such a certification, the application shall
be made effective not earlier than one hundred and eighty days after--(I) the date
the Secretary receives notice from the applicant under the previous application
of the first commercial marketing of the drug under the previous application, or
(II) the date of a decision of a court in an action described in clause (iii) holding
the patent which is the subject of the certification to be invalid or not infringed,
whichever is earlier."5 Put another way, the first6 generic applicant to file an ANDA
containing a paragraph IV certification was to be awarded 180 days of market-
ing exclusivity, during which FDA could not approve a subsequent ANDA that
challenged a patent for the same drug product. The 180 days was calculated from
either the date of the first commercial marketing of the generic drug product by
the first applicant or the date of a court decision declaring the patent invalid or
not infringed, whichever was sooner.7
B. Amended Statutory Language
Section 505(j)(5)(B)(iv) now provides that "[i]f the [abbreviated new drug] ap-
plication contains a certification described in paragraph (2)(A)(vii)(IV) [a para-
graph IV certification] and is a drug for which a first applicant has submitted an
application containing such a certification, the application shall be made effective
on the date that is 180 days after the date of the first commercial marketing of the
drug (including the commercial marketing of the listed drug) by any first appli-
cant."8 In short, as before, the first generic applicant to file an ANDA9 containing
a paragraph IV certification is awarded 180 days of marketing exclusivity, during
which FDA may not approve a subsequently filed ANDA that challenged a patent
for the same drug product. The exclusivity period is now calculated from the date
of the first commercial marketing of the drug product (including the listed drug
product) by a first applicant. A court decision does not by itself start the 180 days
for new ANDAs.
In addition to making these seemingly modest changes to section 505(j)(5)(B)(iv),
Congress added an elaborate provision governing a new statutory concept: forfeiture
of 180-day exclusivity. Under section 505(j)(5)(D), the 180-day exclusivity period is
forfeited by a first applicant if it fails to market the drug by the later of: 1) 75 days
after the date on which approval of its application is effective, or 30 months after
its application was submitted, whichever is earlier; or 2) 75 days after the date on
which, as to each patent that is the subject of a paragraph IV certification by the
first applicant (qualifying it for exclusivity), a court has found the patent invalid or
not infringed, a court signs a settlement order or consent decree finding the patent
invalid or not infringed, or the patent information is withdrawn by the holder of
the approved NDA. The first applicant also forfeits the exclusivity period if any
5 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (1984) (amended 2003).
6 Although the statute refers to "previous" ANDAs, it has been interpreted over time to mean
that only the first applicant is eligible.
I Shortly after enactment of the 2003 amendments, Senator Hatch noted the "incongruity" of
"awarding 180 days both for a successful invalidity challenge and a non-infringement action." The latter,
he noted, benefits only a specific party, the non-infringing generic manufacturer, rather than clearing the
way for generic market entry in general. 149 CONG. REC. S 16104 (daily ed., Dec. 9, 2003) (Sen. Hatch).
8 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2003).
9 As discussed below, there can be more than one "first applicant" eligible for 180-day exclusivity.
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of the following occurs: 1) the first applicant withdraws its application or FDA
considers it withdrawn because it did not meet the requirements for approval; 2)
the first applicant amends or withdraws all of the paragraph IV certifications that
qualified it for exclusivity; 3) the first applicant fails to obtain tentative approval of
its application within 30 months after it was filed (unless the failure is caused by a
change in or review of the requirements for approval of the application imposed
after it was filed); 4) the first applicant enters into an agreement with another ANDA
applicant, the NDA holder, or a patent holder, and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) or a court has found that the agreement violates the antitrust laws; or 5) all
of the patents as to which the first applicant fied a paragraph IV certification quali-
fying it for exclusivity have expired. Forfeiture events are determined individually
for each first applicant. If all first applicants forfeit their 180-day exclusivity, any
subsequent ANDA approval may be made effective immediately-that is, exclusivity
does not "roll over" to a subsequent ANDA applicant.10
Congress also added definitions to the statute for "180-day exclusivity period,"
"first applicant," "substantially complete application," and "tentative approval."
Some of these reflect new concepts. A "first applicant" is "an applicant that, on the
first day on which a substantially complete application containing a [paragraph IV
certification] is submitted for approval of a drug, submits a substantially complete
application that contains and lawfully maintains a [paragraph IV certification] for
the drug." A "substantially complete application" means "an application under this
subsection that on its face is sufficiently complete to permit a substantive review
and contains all the information required by [section 505(j)(2)(A)]."'1
C. Effective Dates
With one exception, the amended rules apply only to ANDAs filed after De-
cember 8, 2003, and only if there was no paragraph IV certification to the listed
drug prior to December 8.12 The exception relates to the "court decision" trigger
for exclusivity, described below in section III-E. Litigation even at the end of 2006
continues to revolve around the old rules.
Ill. INTERPRETIVE ISSUES
As noted above, the original statutory language was sparse. FDA proposed
regulations in 1989 and finalized them in 1994. There has been substantial litigation
over the provisions and regulations, which has led to further changes implemented
by guidance and regulation. Although FDA proposed substantial changes to the
regulations in 1999, the proposal was later withdrawn. Portions of it, however,
continue to be agency policy.
We discuss below twelve interpretive issues that have been the subject of debate
since enactment of 180-day exclusivity in 1984. The issues are arranged concep-
tually. We begin with issues relating to eligibility for exclusivity and timing and
conclude with issues concerning enjoyment of the exclusivity, like transfer of it
and "roll-over" to subsequent applicants. Most of the current debate relates to
10 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D).
21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5)(B)(iv)(II).
12 See Pub. L. No. 108-173 § 1102(b). See FDA, Draft Guidance for Industry, Listed Drugs, 30-
Month Stays, and Approval of ANDAs and 505(b)(2) Applications Under Hatch-Waxman, as Amended
by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (Oct. 2004).
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whether exclusivity attaches to the listed patent or the reference product (see section
Ill-B) and to the effect of changes in the status of the listed patent (e.g., expiry and
delisting) (see sections III-F and IlI-G). A variety of other issues-such as whether
the first applicant must be sued and prevail in patent litigation in order to receive
exclusivity-were resolved long ago.
A. When Must an ANDA Applicant Send Notice of Paragraph IV
Certification to Innovator To Earn 180-Day Exclusivity?
Old ANDAs: Exclusivity attaches to the first applicant to file a substantially com-
plete ANDA with a paragraph IV certification. In the case of an amendment to an
ANDA for a newly listed patent, if notice is provided after the certification is filed,
in violation of the statute's notice provision, agency policy constructively moves the
certification's filing date to the day on which the applicant mailed the notice. This
policy was sustained as a reasonable exercise of agency discretion.
FDA published final regulations to implement the 180-day provision in Octo-
ber 1994.11 Section 314.107(c) stated that if an ANDA contained a paragraph IV
certification and was for a generic copy of the same listed drug "for which one or
more substantially complete abbreviated new drug applications were previously
submitted" containing a paragraph IV certification, and "the applicant submitting
the first application has successfully defended against a suit for patent infringement
brought within 45 days of the patent owner's receipt of notice," then approval of
the second ANDA would be made effective no sooner than the earlier of 1) the date
the first applicant "first commences commercial marketing of its drug product," or
2) the date "of a decision of the court holding the relevant patent invalid, unen-
forceable, or not infringed."' 4 (The "successful defense" requirement is discussed
in section Ill-C, below.) FDA stated that the "applicant submitting the first ap-
plication" is the applicant that submits an application that both 1) is substantially
complete, and 2) contains a paragraph IV certification, prior to the submission of
any other application for the same listed drug that both is substantially complete
and contains the same certification. In other words, the first applicant to satisfy both
requirements would earn exclusivity. According to the regulation, a "substantially
complete" application contains "the results of any required bioequivalence studies,
or, if applicable, a request for a waiver of such studies."' 5
11 54 Fed. Reg. 28872 (July 10, 1989) (proposed rule); 59 Fed. Reg. 50338 (Oct. 3, 1994) (final rule).
14 The statute refers only to a decision holding the patent invalid or not infringed. FDA added
"unenforceable." See 59 Fed. Reg. at 50339 ("The agency, on its own initiative, has also amended [the
proposed regulations] to include a reference to unenforceable patents.... The alternative interpretation
... would be contrary to Congress' obvious intent in allowing patent challenges under section 505 of
the act and would lead to absurd results.").
15 In the preamble to the proposed regulation, FDA had added that a "required bioequivalence
study is one that meets any FDA guidance document or is otherwise reasonable in design and purports to
show that the drug product for which the applicant seeks exclusivity is bioequivalent to the listed drug."
54 Fed. Reg. at 28895. Rejecting concerns about so-called "file first fix later" practices on the part of
generic manufacturers, however, FDA declined to establish criteria to determine whether changes to an
ANDA have been so substantial that it can no longer be considered to have been the first filed. Instead,
it would rely on its decision in 1992 to no longer accept ANDAs lacking complete bioequivalence study
data (if such data are required for approval) and use a "case-by-case approach" to ANDA changes. 59
Fed. Reg. at 50354. FDA added, however that "[a] decision by the agency after receipt of an applica-
tion that the bioequivalence information is inadequate for approval does not necessarily mean that the
application was not substantially complete at the time of submission." This effectively undermined the
1992 solution to what FDA itself referred to as a "significant and unwarranted expenditure of resources
in reviewing applications that had little potential for approval." Id.
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Congress did not change the substance of this requirement in 2003. Under the
amended statutory language, if an ANDA contains a paragraph IV certification and
"is for a drug for which a first applicant has submitted an application containing
such a certification" (i.e., is for a drug for which someone else submitted an ANDA
earning it eligibility for exclusivity) the application "shall be made effective on the
date that is 180 days after the date of the first commercial marketing of the drug
(including the commercial marketing of the listed drug) by any first applicant."
The term "180-day exclusivity period" means "the 180-day period ending on the
day before the date on which an application submitted by an applicant other than
a first applicant could become effective under this clause." As noted above, the term
"first applicant" means "an applicant that, on the first day on which a substan-
tially complete application containing a [paragraph IV] certification is submitted
for approval of a drug, submits a substantially complete application that contains
and lawfully maintains a [paragraph IV certification]." 16 And, as noted earlier, a
''substantially complete application" is ''an application under this subsection that
on its face is sufficiently complete to permit a substantive review and contains all
the information required" under section 505(j)(2)(A) of the FDCA.
Because the statute requires the generic applicant to file a certification at FDA
and provide notice of the certification to the patent owner and NDA holder, there
is in fact a third eligibility requirement-the notice. FDA and the courts addressed
the question of timing of this notice in two cases involving Purepac. The first was
one of several court decisions in the dispute between Purepac and TorPharm over
who would have 180-day exclusivity in marketing generic copies of Neurontin
(gabapentin). This particular dispute involved a drug composition patent submit-
ted by Warner-Lambert to FDA after both TorPharm and Purepac had filed their
ANDAs. Both generic applicants amended their applications to include paragraph
IV challenges to the patent in question. Purepac mailed its amended ANDA to
FDA on May 25, 2000, and FDA received the amended ANDA on May 26. But
Purepac waited until June 13 to send notice to the NDA holder. TorPharm, in
contrast, mailed its amended ANDA and sent notice to the innovator on the same
date, June 13. FDA received TorPharm's amended ANDA on June 16 and deemed
the new certification filed on that day. The agency concluded that the penalty
for Purepac's failure to provide notice simultaneously with its amended ANDA,
as required by 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iii) and 21 C.F.R. § 314.95(d), should be
postponement of the certification's effective date-rather than nullification of the
certification, as TorPharm had argued. Because Purepac still completed both tasks
16 The phrase "lawfully maintain" was added in the Conference Report. One cannot "lawfully
maintain" a patent challenge if one loses the ensuing litigation. And the failure-to-market forfeiture
event applies only to patents for which a paragraph IV certification has been lawfully maintained. Thus,
if an ANDA applicant loses a patent challenge (for example, to a drug substance patent), that patent
challenge no longer qualifies the applicant for exclusivity. The 75-day forfeiture clock would begin
to run as soon as the eligible applicant prevails on a different patent. Put another way, if the ANDA
applicant challenges a formulation patent but adds a frivolous challenge to a drug substance patent,
prevails on the formulation patent and loses on the substance patent, then the 75-day clock begins to
run. This precludes parking exclusivity by challenging two patents, knowing the challenger will lose
on the patent that is not due to expire for some time. Now the generic applicant forfeits exclusivity, if
it cannot market within 75 days of the appellate decision on a patent it successfully challenged. For a
discussion of this issue, see Eli Lilly, Hatch 180-Day Award Concerns May Slow Hatch- Waxman Deal"
www.lnsideHealthPolicy.com (Aug. 7, 2003); CBO Says Generic Rx Language in Both Medicare Bills
Could Delay Drug Competition, HEALTH CARE DAILY (Sept. 2, 2003); Robert A. Armitage, Testimony
on Behalf of Eli Lilly and Company Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, on
the "Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act" (Aug. 1, 2003).
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before TorPharm did, FDA awarded Purepac exclusivity. The district court found
this to be a reasonable exercise of the agency's discretion, and the D.C. Circuit
affirmed on January 20, 2004.1"
On October 29, 2003, Purepac filed suit against FDA concerning a different drug,
challenging the agency's view that when an ANDA applicant submits an amendment
to certify to a newly listed patent, the controlling date for exclusivity purposes is the
date it sent notice to the patent holder and NDA holder. In July 2002, Purepac had
fied an ANDA seeking to market a generic version of Glucophage XR (metformin
hydrochloride extended release). On November 5, 2003, PTO issued a new patent
claiming metformin hydrochloride. FDA listed the patent in the Orange Book on No-
vember 21. On November 5, and on every subsequent business day through November
25, Purepac submitted a paragraph IV certification to that patent. On November
27, Purepac sent notice of the paragraph IV certification to Bristol-Myers Squibb
(BMS), the patent holder. BMS received that notice letter on December 3. IVAX
fied an original ANDA after Purepac amended its ANDA, but before Purepac sent
notice to BMS. IVAX included a paragraph IV certification to the second patent and
notified BMS at that time. FDA awarded exclusivity to IVAX and not to Purepac,
reasoning that the controlling dates for determination of first applicant status were
Purepac's notice date (because Purepac was amending its ANDA) and IVAX's certi-
fication date (because IVAX was filing an original ANDA). FDA approved IVAX's
product on October 28 and the company began shipping the product that same day.
Purepac immediately obtained a restraining order (in a case often called Purepac II),
and FDA suspended its approval of the IVAX product on October 30. The parties
settled the lawsuit by agreeing to share profits during the exclusivity period, and the
judge dismissed the case on November 26, 2003.18
In 2003, Congress amended the notice provision-not the 180-day exclusivity
provision-to specify that a paragraph IV notice must be provided, in the case of
an original ANDA, no later than 20 days after the date of the postmark on the
notice from FDA that the ANDA has been filed. 9 It did not change the statutory
language stating that in the case of an ANDA amendment, notice must be provided
when the generic applicant submits the amendment in question.20 Both IVAX and
Mylan contend, however, that Congress effectively directed FDA to apply the same
rule to original and amended ANDAs-i.e., that it meant to overrule the FDA rule
at issue in the metformin case.2 '
B. What Are the Differences between Shared and Multiple Exclusivity?
The related issues of "shared exclusivity" and "multiple exclusivity" arise in
three situations: 1) multiple generic applicants submit ANDAs with paragraph IV
'7 Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. v. Thompson, 354 E3d 877 (D.C. Cir. 2004), affg TorPharm, Inc. v.
Thompson, 260 FSupp.2d 69 (D.D.C. 2003); see also TorPharm Rebuffed on Bid to Overturn FDA Decision
Awarding Exclusivity to Purepac, BNA PHARMACEUTICAL LAW & INDUsTRY REPORT (Jan. 23,2004); Appeals
Court Backs FDA: Purepac Gets Gabapentin 180-Day Award, FDA WEEK (Jan. 23, 2004).
18 See VAX, Purepac Settle Metformin 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity Suit, FDA WEEK (Dec.
5, 2003); Glucophage XR Settlement: Purepac, IVAX Split Generic Profits for 180 Days, HEALTH NEWS
DAILY (Nov. 28, 2003).
19 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii)(II).
20 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii)(I).
21 IVAX, Citizen Petition, Docket No. 2004P-0520 (Nov. 19, 2004) (arguing that the notice date
should control in both cases) (withdrawn); Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Citizen Petition, Docket No.
2006P-0245 (June 12, 2006) (same) (pending).
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certifications to the same patent(s) on the same first day; 2) multiple ANDA appli-
cants submit ANDAs with paragraph IV certifications for different dosage forms
or strengths of the same innovator drug product; and 3) multiple ANDA applicants
submit ANDAs with paragraph IV certifications to different listed patents for the
same innovator drug product. Stakeholders use the phrases "shared exclusivity"
and "multiple exclusivity" to mean different things. We use "shared exclusivity" to
refer to the first situation described above, where two or more companies file first
ANDAs on the same day, certifying to the same listed patent(s), and thus have the
same claim to exclusivity to share.
If multiple applicants file substantially complete ANDAs with paragraph IV certifi-
cations on the same day as the first to do so, those applicants can share exclusivity.
For old ANDAs, FDA developed this policy following invalidation of the successful
defense requirement (see section 111-C). For new ANDAs, it is required by the amended
statutory language.
FDA interprets the rules governing old ANDAs as permitting "patent-by-patent"
exclusivity, which can create multiple exclusivity periods for a product. Although the
district court in D. C is currently divided on the issue, the most recent decision found
FDA's interpretation to be permissible. In 2003, Congress provided that exclusivity
should be "product-by-product," rather than "patent-by-patent."
Different Strengths. In a 1999 decision involving generic copies of Zantac, the
D.C. Circuit resolved in the affirmative the question whether applicants who market
different dosages of a drug are eligible for separate 180-day exclusivity periods.2
Among the ranitidine hydrochloride products sold by Glaxo as Zantac were 150
mg and 300 mg tablets, both prescription drug products intended for the treat-
ment of ulcers, and 75 mg tablets, sold over the counter (OTC) for the treatment
of heartburn. Genpharm was the first to file an ANDA for the 150 and 300 mg
tablets, and its exclusivity ran in 1997. FDA had since approved additional ANDAs
for those strengths. Novopharm was the first to file an ANDA with a paragraph
IV certification for a 75 mg OTC product and claimed it was therefore eligible for
180-day exclusivity. Apotex sought immediate approval of its own 75 mg tablets,
however, on the theory that FDA may not grant separate exclusivity periods for
ANDA applications that concern patents listed with respect to previously approved
drugs of different strengths. The district court disagreed, holding that permitting
separate exclusivity periods for separate drug strengths is consistent with the statute,
which requires that an ANDA must contain, among other things, "information
to show that the route of administration, the dosage form, and the strength of the
new drug are the same as those of the listed drug."23 (This holding is consistent
with FDA's practice of giving each strength a separate listing in the Orange Book.)
For similar reasons, generic copies of tablet forms and capsule forms of the same
drug are eligible for separate 180-day exclusivity periods. 24
Different Patents. While the appeal in Apotex's ranitidine case was pending, FDA
responded to two citizen petitions, stating that generic applicants who certify to
different patents covering the same listed drug may hold exclusivity simultaneously.
' Apotex v. Shalala, 53 F.Supp.2d 454 (D.D.C. 1999), affd, 1999 WL 956686 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
23 Id at 456 (emphasis added).
24 See, e.g., Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F.Supp.2d at 30, 35 n.8 (D.D.C. 2000)
("The tablet and capsule forms of the drug, however, are distinct products for FDA purposes and are
thus each eligible for their own exclusivity.").
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American Pharmaceutical Partners (APP) and Pharmachemie each had requested
that FDA stay approval of any ANDA other than its own for a generic version of
Platinol-AQ (cisplatin injection). Pharmachemie had filed the first substantially com-
plete ANDA with a paragraph IV certification to one patent listed for the product.
The patent holder did not file suit, and the patent expired. APP had fied the first
substantially complete ANDA with a paragraph IV certification to a different patent
listed for the product. Pharmachemie then did the same thing. BMS filed suit against
both companies, and each argued that it had been the first to file a paragraph IV
certification for the drug. FDA defined the controversy as "whether multiple ANDA
applicants each can be eligible for 180-day exclusivity because each applicant was the
first to file a paragraph IV certification as to a different patent for the listed drug."25
The issue was new. A prior agency policy-just invalidated by a court-had held that
a generic applicant must prevail in patent litigation in order to receive exclusivity (see
discussion of the successful defense requirement in section II-C below). This FDA
policy had effectively precluded more than one applicant from earning exclusivity.
With the elimination of this rule, multiple eligible first applicants became a possibil-
ity. FDA concluded in the petition response that both applicants could be entitled
to exclusivity. FDA stated that its regulations "direct that the inquiry is whether one
or more substantially complete ANDAs were submitted that contained a certifica-
tion that the same patent was invalid, not enforceable, or would not be infringed."
Therefore, the agency wrote, "eligibility for exclusivity is to be determined on a pat-
ent-by-patent basis."26 In this instance, however, FDA granted exclusivity only to APP
The agency reasoned that Pharmachemie's exclusivity had terminated automatically
when the patent in question expired. (This theory was challenged in a citizen petition
relating to Vasotec (enalapril), fied by TorPharm, 27 but the company withdrew the
petition before FDA decided it.)
The agency indicated that it intended to revise its regulations in light of the court
decision invalidating the successful defense requirement and to address the ques-
tion of "multiple 180-day exclusivity periods." 28 Four days later, FDA published its
proposal.29 It made three relevant decisions. First, multiple applicants could share
exclusivity: all ANDAs for a particular drug, with paragraph IV certifications,
received on the same day would be eligible for exclusivity, so long as no ANDAs
had been filed on a previous day.30 Second, as the agency had decided in the Apotex
ranitidine case, applicants would be eligible for a separate exclusivity period for
each strength of the drug product that was a different listed drug.3' Third, exclu-
sivity would be product-by-product. Specifically, "[i]f there are multiple patents
for the listed drug, the applicant submitting the first paragraph IV certification to
any listed patents will be the only ANDA applicant eligible for exclusivity for that
drug. '3 2 FDA withdrew the proposal in 2002.11
The agency confirmed the first decision as agency policy, regardless of the with-
drawal of the 1999 proposal, in a 2003 guidance document. In August 2000, Zenith
25 See FDA, Response to APP and Pharmachemie Citizen Petitions, Docket No. 99P- 1271 (Aug.
2, 1999) at 3.
26 FDA, Response to APP and Pharmachemie Citizen Petitions, Docket No. 99P-1271 (Aug. 2,
1999) at 3
27 TorPharm, Citizen Petition, Docket No. 99P-5317 (Dec. 7, 1999).
28 FDA, Response to APP and Pharmachemie Citizen Petitions, Docket No. 99P-1271 (Aug. 2,
1999), at 3.
29 64 Fed. Reg. 42873 (Aug. 6, 1999).
10 Id. at 42876-42877.
11 Id. at42881.
32 Id. at 42875.
13 67 Fed. Reg. 66593 (Nov. 1, 2002).
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Goldline Pharmaceuticals petitioned FDA for a determination that "all [ANDAs]
containing a paragraph IV certification delivered to FDA's Office of Generic Drugs
(OGD) on the same business day are submitted at the same time for 180-day exclu-
sivity purposes," each receiving 180 days of exclusivity without being subject to the
other's exclusivity.' In an accompanying petition, Zenith Goldline sought a stay of
approval of a competitor's ANDA for alendronate sodium tablets-marketed by the
innovator as Fosamax-until its own ANDA received approval.35 On May 13, 2003,
Ranbaxy Laboratories submitted a citizen petition making the same request as Zenith
Goldline had made, with respect to generic versions of Provigil (modafinil).36
In July 2003, FDA issued a guidance document that permitted "shared exclusivity"
in this situation and wrote both petitioners to explain that the guidance "essentially"
granted their citizen petitions.37 The agency explained that when, on the same day,
more than one applicant submits an ANDA for the same drug containing a para-
graph IV certification to a listed patent, and no such certification was submitted
previously, all the applicants will share exclusivity. Exclusivity will be triggered for
all first applicants for a specific listed patent when one of them begins to market its
product (or on the date of any court decision finding that patent invalid, unenforce-
able, or not infringed, if earlier). The commercial marketing trigger would begin
the 180-day period as to all listed patents; a relevant court decision would trigger it
only as to patents addressed in the decision. This result is also required by the 2003
amendments to the statutory language, which precludes approval for 180 days after
first commercial marketing by "any" first applicant, and which precludes rollover if
"all first applicants" forfeit their exclusivity.38
The question whether exclusivity is patent-by-patent where two patents are listed
for the same listed drug and there is a separate first ANDA for each, not fied on the
same day, has proven more controversial. TorPharm was the first applicant to file
an ANDA for a generic version of Paxil (paroxetine hydrochloride). TorPharm was
also the first to submit a paragraph IV certification challenging the only paroxetine
patent listed at the time. On July 30, 2003, FDA approved TorPharm's ANDA. On
the same day, FDA determined that Alphapharm, which had an ANDA pending,
would be entitled to share exclusivity with TorPharm because it was the first to file
a paragraph IV certification to a later-listed paroxetine patent. Thus, Alphapharm's
product could be approved when its patent situation permitted. TorPharm launched
its product on September 8, 2003, meaning that its 180-day exclusivity would therefore
expire on March 6, 2004. TorPharm fied suit in November 2003, seeking a declara-
tion that FDA's shared exclusivity approach was unlawful and an order enjoining
approval of any other ANDA for paroxetine until March 6, 2004. On January 2, the
judge overturned FDAs decision and permanently enjoined FDA from approving
the Alphapharm ANDA (or any other ANDA for the same dosages of paroxetine
14 Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals, Citizen Petition, Docket No. 00P-1445 (Aug. 8, 2000).
11 Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals, Petition for Stay of Action, Docket No. OOP-1443 (Aug. 8,
2000).
36 Ranbaxy Laboratories, Citizen Petition, Docket No. 03P-0217 (May 13, 2003).
37 FDA, Guidance for Industry, 180-Day Exclusivity when Multiple ANDAs Are Submitted on
the Same Day (July 2003); FDA, Letter to IVAX Pharmaceuticals, Docket No. OOP- 1443 (July 31, 2003);
FDA, Letter to IVAX Pharmaceuticals, Docket No. OOP- 1445 (July 31, 2003); FDA, Letter to Venable,
Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti, Docket No. 03P-02171 (July 31, 2003).
31 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)((II)(bb)(defining "first applicant" to mean "an applicant that,
on the first day on which a substantially complete application containing a [paragraph IV certification]
is submitted for approval of a drug, submits a substantially complete application that contains and law-
fully maintains a [paragraph IV certification] for the drug."); see also 149 CONG. REC. S 15584 (daily ed.,
Nov. 25, 2003) (Senator Kennedy) ("and the exclusivity is available to more than one generic applicant,
if they all challenge patents on the same day"); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(III)( if all first applicants forfeit
exclusivity, "no applicant shall be eligible").
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hydrochloride) until expiration of TorPharm's exclusivity.39 The Department of Justice
appealed for FDA,' but the contested exclusivity period expired on March 6, 2004,
and on December 17, 2004, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot.
4
'
Although this district court's decision on paroxetine would appear to have settled
the issue, another judge on the same court took the opposite view. This case, also,
involved TorPharm-now known as Apotex-but a different drug, Neurontin
(gabapentin). Purepac submitted an ANDA in March 1998 and was the first to
submit a paragraph IV certification for a patent. Apotex submitted an ANDA in
April 1998, including a paragraph IV certification to the same patent. While pat-
ent infringement litigation on that patent was pending against both applicants,
Warner-Lambert listed another patent. Purepac and Apotex amended their AN-
DAs. Apotex prevailed in its litigation on the first patent, and Warner-Lambert
did not appeal. This triggered Purepac's exclusivity on the first patent, which ran
from October 2001 to April 2002. FDA then took the position that Purepac was
entitled to exclusivity on the second patent (as the first filer on that patent) and
that final approval of Apotex's ANDA was subject to the second exclusivity term.
Apotex brought suit, taking issue with FDA's conclusion that Purepac had been
the first filer on the second patent and that Apotex would have to await a relevant
court decision on that patent or commercial marketing by Purepac. It also argued
that the paroxetine decision means there can be only one exclusivity period per
innovator product and that the exclusivity period in question had already run. 2
It therefore challenged FDA's failure to grant final approval of its ANDA.43 In a
June 2004 ruling, the court denied Apotex's motion for a preliminary injunction
and granted the government's motion to dismiss. 4 Although the written order is
sparse, apparently the judge disagreed with the ruling in the paroxetine case, found
the statute ambiguous, and concluded that the agency's patent-by-patent approach
was reasonable. Two federal judges from the same district court, therefore, ruled
differently on the validity of FDA's patent-by-patent approach. 45 The D.C. Circuit,
however, concluded that resjudicata barred Apotex from bringing suit and vacated
the lower court's holding on the merits. 46
In a more recent case, a third judge in the same district addressed the issue
and found FDA's patent-by-patent approach to be permissible. This case involves
ANDAs for 40 mg versions of AstraZeneca's Prilosec (omeprazole). This com-
9 See TorPharm, Inc. v. FDA, 2004 WL 64064 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2004) (written order memorial-
izing oral order and judgment issued on January 2); Court Overturns FDA Decision that TorPharm Must
Share Paxil 180-Day Exclusivity, INSIDE HEALTH POLICY (Jan. 5, 2004).
40 Apotex, Inc. v. FDA, Case No. 04-5046 (D.C. Cir., Notice of Appeal filed Feb. 13, 2004).
4' Apotex, Inc. v. FDA, Case No. 04-5046 (D.C. Cir., Judgment, Dec. 17,2004).
42 See Appeals Court Backs FDA: Purepac Gets Gabapentin 180-day Award, INSIDE WASHINGTON'S
FDA WEEK, (Jan. 23, 2004), at 3.
41 Apotex, Inc. v. Food and Drug Administration, 1:04-cv-00605-ESH (D.D.C. filed (Apr. 14,
2004)).
4 Apotex, Inc. v. Food and Drug Administration, 1:04-cv-00605-ESH (D.D.C., Order, (June 3,
2004)); see Court Split on FDA's Patent-by-Patent Approach to 180-Day Exclusivity, INSIDE WASHINGTON'S
FDA WEEK (June 11, 2004).
41 See Court Split on FDA's Patent-by-Patent Approach to 180-Day Exclusivity, INSIDE WASHING-
TON'S FDA WEEK (June 11, 2004).
41 Apotex v. FDA, 393 F.3d 210 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The case giving rise to resjudicata was Tor-
Pharm, Inc. v. Thompson, 260 FSupp.2d 69 (D.D.C. 2003), discussed in section 111-A above, which
involved the same parties and the same ANDAs. That litigation related to FDA's decision to postpone
the effective date of Purepac's certification to the second patent (rather than nullify it as TorPharm had
argued). Although the causes of action were not the same, Apotex effectively accepted in the first case
that exclusivity was patent-based and argued in the second case that it was not. See also Appeals Court
Says Apotex Cannot Relitigate Fight Over Gabapentin Exclusivity, BNA INC. PHARMACEUTICAL LAW &
INDUSTRY (Dec. 31, 2004).
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plicated situation involves three dosage forms, ten listed patents, and four generic
applicants. 47 FDA granted Andrx 180-day exclusivity on the basis that it was the
first to file an ANDA for 40 mg omeprazole and to challenge the first six listed
patents, only three of which were at issue in the exclusivity litigation. AstraZeneca
brought suit against Andrx and other generic applicants for infringement of these
three patents. Although the court found Andrx infringed two of the three patents
at issue, it granted summary judgment in favor of other generic applicants on the
third patent, holding it not infringed.48 Accordingly, although FDA could not make
approval of the Andrx ANDA effective until expiry of the two infringed patents
(and a pediatric exclusivity period) in October 2007, the ruling on the third pat-
ent triggered its 180-day exclusivity term. In the meantime, Andrx was the first to
challenge four other patents listed by AstraZeneca after the Andrx ANDA was
submitted, earning it a second exclusivity period under FDA's patent-by-patent
approach. Apotex has also filed an ANDA for the strength, and it included a
paragraph IV certification to the two patents that Andrx was found to infringe.
Apotex has received tentative approval, but because of the (second) 180-day term
that Andrx will enjoy in 2007 (assuming FDA makes its ANDA approval effective
then), the soonest Apotex may enter the market is April 2008. Apotex brought suit,
challenging FDAs patent-by-patent approach. The district court found section
505(j)(5)(B)(iv) ambiguous with respect to how many exclusivity periods may arise
in connection with a single drug product, and it found FDAs patent-based approach
"not entirely irrational."49 Under the highly deferential standard of Chevron, 0
therefore, the judge granted the agency's motion for summary judgment. Apotex
appealed to the D.C. Circuit in February 2006, and the appeal was still pending
when this article was drafted.
In 2003, Congress endorsed a product-by-product approach going forward, with
one 180-day exclusivity period per product." If all first applicants forfeit exclusiv-
ity, approval of "any" application containing "a" paragraph IV certification may
be made effective. Accordingly, the ruling in the Apotex omeprazole appeal could
have limited application.
C. Must a Generic Applicant Have Been Sued and Must It Have
Prevailed in That Patent Infringement Suit To Obtain the Benefit
of 180-Day Exclusivity?
No to both. There is no suit or "successful defense" requirement. Another generic could
be sued and prevail instead, triggering the exclusivity, or the case could be dismissed
For new ANDAs, Congress clarified that eligibility is based on being afirst applicant,
and the court decision trigger was removed
47 Apotex v. FDA, 414 FSupp.2d 61 (D.D.C. 2006); see also Federal Court Upholds FDA's Position
on Patent-Based Exclusivity Periods, BNA INC. PHARMACEUTICAL LAW & INDUSTRY (Feb. 17, 2006).
48 See In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation, 222 ESupp.2d 423 (S.D.N.Y (2002)), affd 84 Fed.
Appx. 76 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 11, 2003).
49 414 F.Supp. 2d at 74.
50 Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 83 (1984).
51 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(D)(iii). See also 149 CONG. REC. S 15884 (daily ed., (Nov. 25, 2003))
(Senator Kennedy) ("The Hatch-Waxman provisions in this bill also make the exclusivity available only
with respect to the patent or patents challenged on the first day generic applicants challenge brand drug
patents, which makes the exclusivity a product-by-product exclusivity rather than a patent-by-patent
exclusivity.")
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When FDA initially proposed regulations to implement 180-day exclusivity, it
stated that a generic applicant was entitled to exclusivity only when it has itself
been sued for patent infringement and prevailed in that lawsuit. It stated that, to
provide otherwise "would provide a windfall to an applicant who has not devoted
the considerable time and money necessary for patent litigation."52
After the FDA Commissioner signed the Federal Register notice of the proposed
regulations, but before its publication in the Federal Register, a federal district court
reached a contrary conclusion on the issue whether the generic applicant must have
been sued, itself, by the patent holder. In this case, involving generic copies of In-
deral (propranolol hydrochloride), the district court noted that the "alternatives are
clear"-the "primary ANDA applicant can qualify for exclusivity beginning either
on the date of a court decision invalidating a patent or holding that it is not infringed
or on the date of first commercial marketing of the applicant's product."53 "There
is no ambiguity" in the statute, the court wrote, "that requires the Court or permits
the FDA to read into it a requirement of a lawsuit which is simply not there.' 'M The
agency appealed the decision, however, and the case was dismissed as moot before
FDA concluded the rulemaking.55 In its final regulations, the agency stood by its
earlier position. A generic applicant would be entitled to exclusivity only if it had
successfully defended a patent infringement suit. Neither the court decision nor the
commercial marketing trigger would apply, unless and until the first applicant won
its patent infringement suit.56 FDA believed that to provide otherwise would "create[]
an incentive for frivolous claims of patent invalidity or noninfringement."57
In January 1997, a federal district court invalidated the successful defense require-
ment. In December 1994, Mova filed an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification
to market a generic version of Micronase (micronized glyburide), a diabetes drug
marketed by Pharmacia. Pharmacia sued Mova for infringing its patent. In No-
vember 1995, while Mova was engaged in that litigation, Mylan filed an ANDA
for the same product and eventually filed a paragraph IV certification. Pharmacia
declined to sue, and FDA approved Mylan's application on December 19, 1996.
FDA reasoned that Mova's exclusivity did not bar approval of the Mylan ANDA,
because Mova had not yet successfully defended against Pharmacia's suit. Mova
then brought suit to compel FDA to delay the effective date of its approval of
Mylan's product until 180 days after the earlier of the date Mova won its lawsuit
or the date it began to market its product. Mova challenged the successful defense
regulation as contrary to the plain language of the statute. The district court found
that Mova had a very high likelihood of success on the merits of its claim and
granted a preliminary injunction.5"
In 1998, the D.C. Circuit affirmed that holding. 9 Although FDA argued that its
successful defense requirement furthered the intent of Congress, the court disagreed.
52 54 Fed. Reg. at 50352-50353.
53 Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Young, 723 ESupp. 1523, 1526 (D.D.C. 1989), vacated as moot,
no. 89-5209 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 13, 1989).
5 Id.
11 Inwood asked the court of appeals to declare the case moot when six months had elapsed after
the lower court enjoined FDA from approving another ANDA. See Inwood Case May Not Set Precedent
on Exclusivity, WASHINGTON DRUG LETTER (Oct. 30, 1989), at 2.
56 See Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F3d 1060, 1069-1070 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discuss-
ing FDA's interpretation).
57 59 Fed. Reg. at 50353.
58 Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 955 F.Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1997).
59 Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 E 3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
VOL. 62
2007 ISSUES IN THE INTERPRETATION OF 180-DAY EXCLUSITY 61
The successful defense requirement, the court wrote, is "gravely inconsistent with
the text and structure of the statute." I The D.C. Circuit explained, "[T]he com-
mercial-marketing trigger seems intended to insure that, if a first ANDA applicant
chooses to begin marketing its product before it has won its patent-infringement
suit, the 180-day exclusivity period will begin to run immediately. Under the FDAs
regulation, however, the 180-day exclusivity period is only available to an applicant
who has already 'successfully defended against a suit for patent infringement."' 6 Its
practical effect, the court wrote, is "to write the commercial-marketing trigger out
of the statute."62 The court recognized the issue, raised by Mylan, that the statutory
scheme might penalize a meritorious second ANDA applicant.63 Nevertheless, the
court found that the successful defense requirement was too "blunt an instrument"
to address that issue.' The regulation was, thus, invalid. The glyburide case (usually
referred to as "Mova") therefore established that the first generic applicant need
not successfully defend a patent infringement suit in order to enjoy the benefit of
180-day exclusivity.65
After the district court found FDA's successful defense regulation invalid,66 FDA
decided to cease enforcing the regulation pending appeal. During the pendency of
that appeal, the Fourth Circuit similarly invalidated the successful defense require-
ment in a case involving generic versions of Zantac.67 There were two crystalline
forms of ranitidine (Forms 1 and 2), and Form 2 was covered by a separate patent,
the '431 patent. In February 1991, Genpharm filed an ANDA for a generic Form 2
ranitidine product and included a paragraph IV certification to the '431 patent. It
was, therefore, the first to file. GlaxoWellcome (Glaxo) sued Genpharm for patent
infringement and prevailed in 1995. In 1996, Genpharm filed another paragraph
IV certification under the ANDA, alleging that it would market a Form 1 ranitidine
product that did not infringe the '431 patent. Glaxo again sued. In April 1994, in
the interim between the two Genpharm paragraph IV certifications, Granutec filed
an ANDA that included a paragraph IV certification also alleging that it would
market a Form I product that did not infringe the '431 patent. Glaxo brought
suit, but Granutec prevailed. Glaxo and Granutec then entered into a licensing
agreement for the final 15 days of the other patent, the '658 patent,6 8 and Granutec
sought FDA approval of its ANDA beginning July 10, 1997. FDA refused, stating
that Genpharm's exclusivity had been triggered on March 3, 1997, when Glaxo's
right to appeal expired with respect to a "wholly unrelated" district court decision
that Boehringer Ingelheim's generic version of Form 1 ranitidine did not infringe
60 Id. at 1069.
61 Id. at 1069-70.
62 Id. at 1069. The court reasoned that "if the first applicant begins marketing its product before
it wins its infringement suit, the 180 days of exclusivity do not begin to run; other applicants remain
eligible for FDA approval to begin marketing their products, at least up to the date that the first ap-
plicant wins the infringement action." Id. at 1070.
63 Id. at 1072.
4 Id. at 1074.
65 In dictum, the court also approved as "elegant and textually persuasive" an argument made
by Teva (as amicus curiae) that the court decision trigger may be satisfied by any decision of a court
holding the patent invalid or not infringed-including suits not brought by the patent holder, such as a
declaratory judgment action by the second ANDA applicant. Id. at 1072-1073. The court noted, how-
ever, that it "seems odd to reward the first applicant if some later applicant was the party that actually
prevailed in the patent-infringement litigation." Id. at 1073.
66 955 F.Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1997).
67 Granutec, Inc. v. Shalala, 139 E3d 889 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished).
61 139 F.3d 889, at *4.
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Glaxo's '431 patent.69 FDA concluded that because Genpharm had filed the first
ANDA for generic ranitidine, and because FDA had suspended the successful de-
fense requirement after the district court decision in Mova, Genpharm was entitled
to exclusivity. (Genpharm did not, however, have final approval of its ANDA.).
Granutec then brought suit, arguing that FDAs refusal to enforce the successful
defense requirement was arbitrary and capricious. The district court agreed and
issued an injunction requiring FDA to adhere to the successful defense requirement.
This would effectively mean that no company would be entitled to exclusivity. The
Fourth Circuit reversed, in an unpublished opinion, finding that the statute did
not require a successful defense against a patent infringement suit. Genpharm was
thus entitled to exclusivity.
Shortly after this decision and the Mova court of appeals decision invalidat-
ing the successful defense requirement, FDA published a guidance for industry.7°
This guidance detailed a new approach to 180-day exclusivity in light of the court
decisions. FDA announced its intent to "formally" remove the successful defense
requirement from the regulation and to issue new regulations.7 In the meantime,
FDA stated, it would "regulate directly from the statute" and "make decisions on
180-day generic drug exclusivity on a case-by-case basis. 7 2 The agency would inform
the first applicant to submit a substantially complete abbreviated application with a
paragraph IV certification that it was eligible for 180 days of exclusivity even though
it had not been sued for patent infringement.73 In November 1998, FDA published
an interim rule, eliminating the successful defense requirement.74
In December 1998, the D.C. Circuit confirmed that the first generic need not
be sued for patent infringement to be eligible for exclusivity.75 TorPharm was the
first to file an ANDA for a generic version of Ticlid (ticlopidine hydrochloride).
Its ANDA contained a paragraph IV certification. The patent owner did not file
suit against TorPharm. FDA tentatively approved an ANDA filed by Purepac, but
because the agency had not given final approval to TorPharm and there was not
a qualifying court decision, TorPharm's exclusivity had not begin to run. Accord-
ingly, FDA withheld final approval of Purepac's ANDA pending TorPharm's final
approval, commercial marketing, and expiry of its 180-day exclusivity. Purepac sued
FDA seeking an injunction claiming that TorPharm was not entitled to exclusivity
because it had not been sued for infringement. The D.C. Circuit ultimately con-
cluded that FDAs "revised system for granting exclusivity" was consistent with the
statute and the Mova decision, noting that the statute does not on its face require
the first applicant to be sued in order to benefit from market exclusivity.76 Thus,
FDA could withhold final approval of the Purepac ANDA until TorPharm had
commercially marketed for 180 days.
If, however, a first applicant loses a patent infringement case, it must under FDA
regulations amend its certification to a paragraph III certification, and it is no
69 See id at *5 (citing Glaxo, Inc. v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp., 954 F.Supp. 469 (D.Conn. 1996),
judgment entered by 962 F.Supp. 295 (D.Conn. 1997), affd, No. 97-1283, 1997 WL 355339 (Fed. Cir.
June 4, 1997).
70 See FDA, Guidance for Industry, 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity Under the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments to the FDCA (June 1998).
71 Id at 4.
72 Id.
71 Id. at 5.
74 63 Fed. Reg. 59710 (Nov. 5, 1998).
7 Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Friedman, 162 F3d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
76 162 F.3d at 1204.
VOL. 62
2007 ISSUES IN THE INTERPRETATION OF 180-DAY EXCLUSIvrrY 63
longer eligible for exclusivity. This was confirmed in a 2000 case involving generic
tamoxifen. The Southern District of New York had invalidated Imperial's patent,
but that decision was subsequently appealed and vacated pursuant to a settlement
agreement between Imperial and the generic manufacturer (Barr)." Also pursuant
to the settlement, Barr amended its ANDA to change from a paragraph IV to a
paragraph III certification.7" Barr also obtained a license to market the product
prior to patent expiry.79 FDA declined to treat the New York decision as a "court
decision" for purposes of exclusivity and instead agreed with Barr that its exclusivity
was intact. 0 Mylan, a subsequent filer, sued FDA. The district court held that Barr
had waived its eligibility for 180-day exclusivity, explaining that once a company
changes its certification, the ANDA is no longer considered to have "contained" a
paragraph IV certification.8 1 This meant Barr was no longer eligible for exclusivity,
and because FDA took the position that there was no "rolling exclusivity" under
the statute,82 the agency could approve Mylan's ANDA.
D. What Kind of Court Decision Triggers 180-Day Exclusivity?
The court decision trigger applicable to old ANDAs requires a decision of a court that
on its face evidences a holding on the merits of patent non-infringement, invalidity, or
unenforceability. In 2003, Congress eliminated the court decision trigger for exclusivity
for new ANDAs (although it addressed it as a forfeiture event).
This issue was addressed in the context of two products several years apart. As
noted above, TorPharm was the first to file an ANDA for ticlopidine hydrochloride,
a generic version of Ticlid. On June 20, 1997, Teva Pharmaceuticals filed an ANDA
for ticlopidine hydrochloride, and was not sued for patent infringement. Teva then
sued the patent owner, Syntex, in the Central District of California for a declaratory
judgment of non-infringement. After Syntex admitted that Teva's product did not
infringe its patent, the California court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 3 On October 29, 1998, FDA tentatively approved Teva's ANDA. FDA
informed Teva, however, that because there was a prior ANDA applicant and neither
commercial marketing nor a relevant court decision had occurred, Teva's application
was ineligible for final approval. Teva argued to FDA, to no avail, that the California
court's dismissal of its declaratory judgment suit against Syntex satisfied the "court
decision" requirement, triggering the first fier's exclusivity. Teva then brought suit in
federal district court in the District of Columbia, seeking to have its ANDA approved
" See Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Henney, 94 FSupp.2d 36 (D.D.C. 2000), vacated and dismissed
as moot, 276 F3d 627 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
11 94 ESupp.2d at 41.
79 Id.
80 Id at 42.
81 Id. at 56-57. On May 24,2001, Gary Buehler, Acting Director of FDA's Office of Generic Drugs,
confirmed FDA's view by telling the Senate Judiciary Committee that "[o]nly an application containing
a paragraph IV certification may be eligible for exclusivity. If an applicant changes from a paragraph IV
certification to a paragraph III certification, for example upon losing its patent infringement litigation,
the ANDA will no longer be eligible for exclusivity." Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace:
Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. 12 (2001) (Statement of Gary Buehler, RPh).
82 64 Fed. Reg. 42873 (Aug. 6, 1999). See the discussion below in section III-I.
83 Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc. v. FDA, 182 E3d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("The California
court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction after finding, based on the patent
holder's admission of non-infringement, that Teva lacked a reasonable apprehension of suit by the
patent holder."). The California decision was not published.
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effective 180 days after the California court dismissed the declaratory judgment suit.
The district court upheld FDA's decision and denied injunctive relief.
The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that FDA's unexplained refusal to recognize
dismissal by the California court as the functional equivalent of a final decision of
non-infringement was arbitrary." The D.C. Circuit's discussion suggested several
points. First, any court decision with "preclusive effect," even a dismissal of a declara-
tory judgment action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, may trigger exclusivity.
"A 'decision' can take several forms," the court wrote "including final judgment after
a full trial, summary judgment or partial summary judgment, or even dismissal for
failure to state a cause of action."85 Second, although the statute provides that exclu-
sivity dates to a decision that the patent is invalid or not infringed, FDA's regulations
have since 1994 said, "invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed." The D.C. Circuit
rejected the argument that estoppel (in the case at hand) should be treated differently
from unenforceability (in the regulation), invalidity, and non-infringement. 6 Third,
the court decision that triggers exclusivity need not involve the first generic. It may,
instead, involve the patent holder and another ANDA applicant. Thus, if the pioneer
has sued subsequent ANDA filers for patent infringement on the same drug, a deci-
sion of a district court finding the patent invalid, not infringed, or unenforceable in
any of those cases will trigger exclusivity.8
7
A decision from the court of appeals in 2006 has prompted FDA to re-evaluate
the court decision trigger. On December 20, 2000, Teva filed the first ANDA to
market generic copies of Pravachol (pravastatin sodium) in 10, 20, and 40 mg tablets.
Teva included a paragraph III certification on the product patent (the patent on the
molecule itself) and paragraph IV certifications as to certain other listed patents.
Bristol-Myers did not sue Teva or any of the other generic drug manufacturers that
filed applications with paragraph IV certifications. Teva's ANDA was tentatively
approved (pending expiry of the product patent) in May 2002. One of the other ge-
neric applicants, Apotex, sued Bristol-Myers in October 2003, seeking a declaratory
judgment that the patents in question were invalid or not infringed by Apotex. In
July 2004, the court entered a "stipulation and order," signed by both parties, stating
that Bristol-Myers had "no intention to bring suit against Apotex for infringement."
Apotex then returned to FDA, asking that it find this to be a "court decision" that
triggered Teva's exclusivity. FDA agreed, apparently concluding that the decision in
the Teva ticlopidine case meant any dismissal of a declaratory judgment case triggers
exclusivity. This meant Teva's exclusivity would run before the patent expired for which
Teva had submitted a Paragraph III certification, so Teva brought suit.
84 Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc. v. FDA, 182 E3d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
85 Id. at 1007-1008.
86 Id. at 1009.
87 Following this decision, FDA provided a rationale for refusing to recognize dismissal of
Teva's declaratory judgment action as a triggering court decision. In essence, FDA explained, generic
applicants seeking to avail themselves of the court decision trigger must submit a copy of the court
decision in question. The agency will not review any additional papers from the underlying litigation.
The reason for Teva's dismissal "was not evident from the face of the court order, the court did not
issue a memorandum opinion explaining the basis for the order," and requiring staff in the Office of
Generic Drugs to delve beyond these documents would "place an unbearable burden" on the office. On
remand, the district court rejected FDA's explanation, noting-among other things-that "this is not a
case where a great deal of sophisticated legal analysis is required." In addition, the court noted, FDA
had not met the challenge of squaring its approach to the California dismissal with its handling of the
Boehringer decision (a partial summary judgment on the basis of an admission of non-infringement)
that triggered the exclusivity at issue in the Granutec case. FDA's claim that the California decision was
not a "holding" failed, for example, because the term is open to interpretation. Teva Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc. v. United States Food & Drug Administration, 1999 WL 1042743 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 1999),
affd 254 E3d 316 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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In March 2006, the D.C. Circuit rejected FDA's reading of the Teva ticlopidine
decision. In the ticlopidine case, it explained, "the court stated the statute could
be interpreted to include dismissals of declaratory judgment actions as triggering
events," but "it left the final decision to FDA.""8 In short, the court only found the
trigger ambiguous. The agency "mistakenly thought itself bound," which "renders its
decision arbitrary and capricious." 89 Thus, "[w]hile the statute may preclude treating
voluntary dismissals ... as triggering events, we express no opinion on the matter."
Instead, it is "up to the agency to ... make a reasonable policy choice," and "FDA has
not yet done so."' 9 The agency responded to this court decision in an April 11 letter
to Apotex and the other generic applicants, stating that "FDA interprets the court
decision trigger provision to require a decision of a court that on its face evidences a
holding on the merits of patent non-infringement, invalidity, or unenforceability."9'
In the case at hand, therefore, Teva's exclusivity period had not been triggered by the
July 2004 dismissal of the Apotex litigation. Following another rush of litigation by
Apotex (a request for injunction and then appeal to the D.C. Circuit), FDA granted
Teva final approval on April 24.92
In 2003, Congress eliminated the court decision trigger for 180-day exclusivity.
For new ANDAs, exclusivity begins with the first commercial marketing of the drug
product by a first applicant. Although Congress eliminated the court decision trigger
for beginning the period of exclusivity, it established a new court decision trigger
for forfeiture of exclusivity.93 The legislative history contains a reference to the Teva
ticlopidine case,94 but FDA's subsequently adopted April 2006 policy presumably
applies.
E. What Level of Court Decision Triggers 180-Day Exclusivity?
This is the sole topic on which the 2003 legislation is retroactive. For old ANDAs,
exclusivity begins when a decision is rendered by "the court from which no appeal
(other than a petition of the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari) has been or can
88 Teva v. FDA, 441 F3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
89 Id. at 6.
9 Id.
9' FDA, Letter to Pravastatin ANDA Applicant (Apr. 11, 2006), available at www.fda.gov/cder/
ogd/announce/Pravastatin- 180Day-amend.pdf; see also FDA Narrows Interpretation of Exclusivity Court
Decision Triggers, [THE PINK SHEET] (Apr. 17, 2006).
92 FDA Approves Teva's Generic Pravastatin, As Court Denies Apotex Emergency Relief, BNA, INC.
PHARMACEUTICAL LAW & INDUSTRY (Apr. 28, 2006). Apotex Inc. v. FDA, D.D.C., No. 06-00627 (April
19, 2006) (denying motions for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction); Apotex Inc. v.
FDA, D.C. Cir., No. 06-5105 (April 20,2006) (granting emergency motion for injunctive relief-issuing
administrative injunction-pending further order of the.court); D.C. Cir., No. 06-5105 (April 24,2006)
(dissolving administrative injunction and denying motion for injunctive relief pending appeal).
93 Put simply, once the first generic obtains final approval of its ANDA, its exclusivity does not
begin to run until it commercially markets, and-unless another forfeiture provision applies-that ex-
clusivity is not forfeited until 75 days after a court decision on every patent qualifying it for exclusivity.
Shortly after passage of the 2003 amendments, Senator Hatch pointed out that if the court decision in
question involves a different ANDA applicant-i.e., if the second applicant, not the first, successfully
challenged the innovator's patents-the first generic is still entitled to exclusivity, and, indeed, could
launch on the 74th day after the court decision, thereby effectively blocking the second applicant for
254 days. In his view, at least in the winter of 2003, this inappropriately penalizes the successful patent
challenger. 149 CONG. REC. S 16104 (daily ed., Dec. 9, 2003) (Sen. Hatch).
94 See 149 CONG. REC. S 15885 (daily ed., Nov. 25, 2003) (Sen. Kennedy) ("We do intend that a
court decision like the one in the D.C. Circuit's 1999 decision in Teva v. Shalala-a decision dismiss-
ing a declaratory judgment action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the patent owner has
represented that the patent is not infringed-will count as a court decision under the new 'failure to
market' provision.").
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be taken." There is no court decision trigger for exclusivity for new ANDAs, but a
similar rule applies to a forfeiture event.
In the preamble to its final 1994 regulations, FDA stated that the court decision
activating the court decision trigger "must be a final decision from which no appeal
can be or has been taken."9 A federal district court disagreed in January 2000.96 In a
case involving generic copies of Hytrin (terazosin hydrochloride)-often referred to
as Mylan I-a federal district court rejected FDAs position that the triggering event
is "either the date that a district court decision is affirmed by the Federal Circuit, or
the date on which the time for filing an appeal has lapsed." 97 In other words, the court
held that "decision of a court" includes "the decision of a United States district court
regardless of whether that decision is appealed." 9 The rule that resulted, therefore,
was that the first generic's 180-day exclusivity period began to run on the date of a
district court decision finding invalidity, unenforceability, or non-infringement.
In March 2000, FDA issued a guidance document responding to this court deci-
sion. 99 The agency stated that it would interpret the term "court" to mean "the first
court that renders a decision finding the patent at issue invalid, unenforceable, or
not infringed.' °°0It would apply this to both 30-month stays and 180-day exclusiv-
ity. Thus, if a district court rendered such a decision, the 30-month stay would end
for that ANDA as of the date the district court entered its decision, and 180-day
exclusivity for the first filer would also begin to run on that date (unless it had begun
already with commercial marketing). Neither a stay nor a reversal of this decision
would lead to revocation of approval of that ANDA or the first fier's 180-day
exclusivity. If a district court found patent infringement, however, and that ruling
was reversed by the Federal Circuit, that generic's ANDA would be approved and
the 180-day exclusivity would start "on the date the district court issues a judgment
that the patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed pursuant to a mandate
issued by a court of appeals."' 1 FDA agreed that this could compromise companies
that had developed marketing strategies in reliance on the old definition of court
decision. It could put them in the position of exposing themselves to damages if
they market (to take advantage of the 180-day period) but lose in the appeal of the
patent case. The new definition of court would therefore apply only to ANDAs filed
after March 30, 2000.102 In July 2000, FDA published'interim regulations amend-
ing the definition of "court decision" as detailed in the March 2000 guidance and
consistent with the terazosin decision.
10 3
Congress reversed the rule in 2003, however, and this is the sole topic on which
the 2003 legislation is retroactive. Exclusivity for old ANDAs begins when a de-
cision is rendered by "the court from which no appeal (other than a petition of
the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari) has been or can be taken."' 04 There is
91 59 Fed. Reg. at 50354.
96 Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Shalala, 81 ESupp.2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
91 Id at 41-42.
91 Id. at 47.
9 FDA, Guidance for Industry, Court Decisions, ANDA Approvals, and 180-Day Exclusivity
Under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the FDCA (Mar. 2000).
l00 Id. at 4.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 65 Fed. Reg. 43233 (July 13, 2000).
104 Pub. L. No. 108-173 § I 101(b)(3). By way of contrast, when it amended the statute in 2003
Congress provided that 30-month stays for new ANDAs would end with a district court decision. Thus,
under the MMA district court decisions will end 30-month stays but not trigger the running of the 180
days. If the 30-month stay ends, however, and FDA approves the ANDA, any commercial marketing
under the ANDA will trigger 180-day exclusivity for old ANDAs or new ANDAs.
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no court decision trigger for exclusivity for new ANDAs. And the court decision
trigger for forfeiture of exclusivity is unambiguous: the period is forfeited if the
applicant fails to market 75 days after, as to each patent at issue, "a court enters a
final decision from which no appeal (other than a petition to the Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari) has been or can be taken that the patent is invalid or not
infringed" (unless 75 days have not elapsed since the ANDA approval was effective
and 30 months have not elapsed since the ANDA was submitted).
F. What Is the Effect of Patent Expiry once a Paragraph IV
Certification Has Been Submitted?
If a patent expires before the first generic applicant has final approval of its ANDA,
the applicant must amend its certification from a paragraph IV to a paragraph H and
will no longer be entitled to 180 days of exclusivity when finally approved.
On October 14, 2003, a federal district court in New Jersey found that Dr. Reddy's
Laboratories was not entitled to share Andrx's 180-day exclusivity for generic copies
of Prilosec (omeprazole) 05 Although Andrx was the first to file a paragraph IV
certification to the 40 mg version on ten of the eleven patents listed by AstraZeneca,
Dr. Reddy's was the first to file a paragraph IV for the 40 mg version on the other
patent. 106 (Andrx filed a paragraph III.) The patent expired after both ANDAs
were tentatively approved, but before either was finally approved. FDA concluded
that Dr. Reddy's lost its eligibility for exclusivity when the patent expired, on the
theory that the company was required at that time to amend its ANDA to convert
the paragraph IV certification to a paragraph II certification.0 7 Dr. Reddy's sued
FDA in the District of New Jersey. The court noted that the agency had set forth
its interpretation of the statute at least twice prior to its decision on Dr. Reddy's
application. 08 Dr. Reddy's argued that FDA may not require generic applicants
to amend their certifications prior to final ANDA approval, and that an ANDA is
eligible for exclusivity if it contains the appropriate paragraph IV certification at
the time of filing. The court found the statute ambiguous on both points, however,
and upheld the agency's decision' °9
For new ANDAs, the first applicant forfeits exclusivity if all of the patents
as to which it filed a paragraph IV certification qualifying it for exclusivity have
expired.10
G. What Is the Effect of Delisting Patent once Paragraph IV Certifi-
cation Has Been Submitted?
With respect to old ANDAs, generally speaking, if a patent is removed from the Or-
ange Book, FDA requires ANDA sponsors to delete their paragraph IV certifications.
101 Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, Inc. v. Thompson, 302 F.Supp.2d 340 (D.N.J. 2003).
1o6 Id. at 345.
107 See 21 C.ER. § 314.94(a)(12)(viii)(C).
101 Id at 351, citing 59 Fed. Reg. 50338, 50348 (Oct. 3, 1994) ("a patent is deemed to be relevant
until the end of the term of the patent or applicable 180-day period, whichever occurs first") and FDA,
Response to APP and Pharmachemie Citizen Petitions, 99P-1271 (Aug. 2, 1999). The court character-
ized the latter as stating that, "because exclusivity cannot extend beyond the expiration of a patent, an
ANDA applicant who is first to file a paragraph IV certification on a patent loses its eligibility based
upon that patent when the patent expires before either of the triggering events occurs."
109 Id. at 354-355.
110 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(VI).
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FDA's policy creating an exception ifa first ANDA applicant were sued by the patent
owner was recently found to be inconsistent with the statute.
Earlier we discussed litigation involving Purepac and TorPharm over generic cop-
ies of Neurontin (gabapentin), including a case where FDA decided the penalty for
Purepac's failure to provide notice simultaneously with its paragraph IV certification
was postponement of the certification's effective date. Also at issue in the case was
a patent that had been listed in the Orange Book and then, after litigation, deemed
by FDA to be ineligible for listing.I" The patent in question claimed a method of
use of Neurontin in the treatment of neurodegenerative diseases for which the
innovator drug was not approved, and for which the ANDA applicants therefore
could not seek approval." 2 In another lawsuit, a district court determined that
Purepac's "section viii" statement as to this patent was appropriate."3 TorPharm
had, however, submitted a paragraph IV certification on the patent. Under agency
regulations, when a patent has been the "subject of a lawsuit" based on a para-
graph IV certification, it may be delisted only if no ANDA applicant is entitled to
exclusivity on the patent." 4 Under well-established agency policy, however, where a
section viii statement is proper, a paragraph IV certification is not. In the gabapentin
situation, FDA determined that-in light of the ruling that Purepac's section viii
statement was appropriate-TorPharm's paragraph IV certification was improper.
This eliminated TorPharm's eligibility for exclusivity. FDA also removed the patent
from the Orange Book, on the ground that it claimed a use the agency had not ap-
proved. No company was therefore entitled to exclusivity on the patent. The district
court found this decision to be reasonable, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed." 5
As noted, when FDA delists a patent, any applicant with a pending ANDA who
has made a certification with respect to that patent must amend its certification."16
Agency regulations, however, create an exception if the first applicant (as to that
patent) has been sued. I In this situation, FDA policy was not to delist the patent.
A court of appeals recently invalidated this regulation. IVAX sought approval of
generic 5 mg, 10 mg, 20 mg, and 40 mg versions of Merck's Zocor (simvastatin).
IVAX was the first generic applicant to challenge two patents claiming approved
methods of use. The patents in question apparently claimed compounds related
to simvastatin, rather than simvastatin itself" 8 Following submission of the IVAX
" Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. v. Thompson, 2004 WL 76594 (D.C.Cir. Jan 20, 2004), affg
TorPharm, Inc. v. Thompson, 260 ESupp.2d 69 (D.D.C. 2003); see also TorPharm Rebuffed on Bid
to Overturn FDA Decision Awarding Exclusivity to Purepac, BNA PHAAMACEUTICAL LAW & INDUSTRY
REPORT (Jan. 23, 2004); Appeals Court Backs FDA: Purepac Gets Gabapentin 180-Day Award, FDA
WEEK (Jan. 23, 2004).
112 FDA clarified in its 2003 regulations that only patents claiming approved uses could be listed.
This is confirmed in the 2003 amendments, which authorize a counterclaim to an infringement case on
the grounds that a listed method of use patent does not claim an approved use of the product.
"1 Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. v. Thompson, 238 FSupp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2002). A section viii
statement states that the patent in question has been listed but does not claim a use for which the ANDA
applicant seeks approval. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii). Because it is not a paragraph IV certification,
it does not entitle the innovator to notice, and it does not entitle the ANDA applicant to exclusivity.
114 21 C.FR. § 314.94(a)(12)(viii)(B).
115 Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. v. Thompson, 2004 WL 76594 (D.C.Cir. Jan 20, 2004), affg
TorPharm, Inc. v. Thompson, 260 F.Supp.2d 69 (D.D.C. 2003).
116 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(viii)(B).
117 Id.
I" The FTC characterized the substance as "related to" simvastatin. Federal Trade Commission,
Response to Citizen Petition by IVAX Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Docket No. 2005P-0008 (April 5, 2005),
at 4. Ranbaxy characterized the compounds as "related compounds of simvastatin" that it believed to
be "present in Zocor" and that were "a byproduct of Merck's manufacture of simvastatin." Ranbaxy
Laboratories Limited, Citizen Petition, Docket No. 2005P-0046 (Feb. 1, 2005), at 2.
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ANDA, FDA amended its regulations to state that listed drug substance patents
must claim the active ingredient of an approved drug product, rather than a me-
tabolite or an intermediate." 9 At Merck's request, and following several additional
letters to the agency (from private law firms, presumably representing generic com-
pany interests) stating that the patents should not be listed, the agency removed
the patents from the Orange Book. This had the effect of permitting subsequent
ANDA applicants to omit certifications relating to the patents. IVAX petitioned
the agency to reinstate the patents and not approve subsequent ANDAs until its
180 days of exclusivity had concluded.2 0 Ranbaxy filed a citizen petition with
respect to 80 mg simvastatin and raised the same issue with respect to the same
two delisted patents.'2 Teva opposed the petitions, arguing that, "incorrectly listed
patents cannot support exclusivity."' 22
In a 20-page letter, FDA denied both petitions, stating that it does "not interpret
the statute to require that an ANDA applicant who has submitted the first paragraph
IV certification to a patent always remain eligible for 180-day exclusivity as to that
patent even if the NDA holder has asked that the patent be delisted."' 2 3 Instead,
FDA noted, it is "consistent with the language and purposes of the statute generally
to delist a patent when the NDA holder requests that we do so" and to therefore
"remove the basis for exclusivity as to that patent." There is "one limited exception"
(to this "ministerial" role) in the regulations, pursuant to which FDA maintains the
listing of a patent where the paragraph IV challenge of the first ANDA applicant
has resulted in litigation. This ensures that victory in the patent litigation, which
would result in delisting of the patent, will not also result in loss of exclusivity.
Merck had not sued either IVAX or Ranbaxy, however, so this limited exception
did not apply. The patents were delisted, and FDA concluded that neither generic
manufacturer was entitled to exclusivity with respect to the patents. 24
In litigation that followed, however, both the district court and the D.C. Circuit
found that FDA should not have delisted the patents. The district court noted
that section 505(j)(5)(B)(iv) is "clear and unambiguous" in providing that the
first generic applicant may qualify for exclusivity "in one of two ways"' 25 -i.e., a
court decision or commercial marketing. Further, "[o]f the two methods Congress
has provided by which the first ANDA applicant's 180-day period of exclusivity
is triggered, one requires litigation and one does not.' 1 26 The issue, according to
the court, was whether FDA could "effectively restrict the reward to only a sued
ANDA holder, by delisting a patent after the ANDA holder successfully avoided
suit."' 27 It noted that the delisting practice "as applied here effectively eliminated
Congress's 'first commercial marketing' trigger, in violation of the clear command
of Congress.' 12 Although FDA may adopt a delisting practice, it cannot favor
"one of two equal statutory provisions over the other."' 129 The agency relisted the
119 68 Fed. Reg. 36676 (June 18, 2003).
120 IVAX Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Citizen Petition, Docket No. 2005P-0008 (Jan. 5, 2005).
2I Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited, Citizen Petition, Docket No. 2005P-0046 (Feb. 1, 2005).
'2 Teva, Response, Docket No. 2005P-0046 (June 8, 2005), at 2.
123 FDA, Response, Docket Nos. 2005P-0008 and 2005P-0046 (Oct. 24, 2005).
124 Id. at 2.
125 Ranbaxy v. Leavitt, 2006 WL 1147797 (D.D.C. (April 30, 2006), at 7; see also Ivax, Ranbaxy
Score Win on Generic Zocor As Court Reverses FDA on Exclusivity Issue, BNA, INC. PHARMACEUTICAL
LAW & INDUSTRY (May 5, 2006).
126 Id
127 Id. at 8.
128 Id.
129 Id.
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patents in June 2006, and in November the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court's decision.
130
For new ANDAs, the MMA contains a forfeiture provision based on withdrawal
of patent listings. Specifically, if 75 days have elapsed since approval of the first
applicant's ANDA was made effective (or 30 months have elapsed since the first
applicant's ANDA was submitted), then if the last of the patents qualifying it for
exclusivity is delisted, the first applicant will forfeit exclusivity if it fails to market
within 75 days.3
H. Are 180-day Exclusivity Rights Waivable andlor Transferable?
FDA developed a policy that the first generic may relinquish its exclusivity altogether
at any time and may waive its 180-day exclusivity rights in favor of another specific
generic applicant after exclusivity is triggered. Congress did not address this issue in
2003, and presumably this continues to be agency policy.
In a 1997 case relating to generic copies of Zantac (ranitidine hydrochloride),
a federal district court rejected a motion for a temporary restraining order, after
FDA approved an ANDA filed by a second applicant who had purchased 180-day
exclusivity from the first applicant.1 2 The court noted that the Hatch-Waxman
amendments are silent on the question of transferability of 180-day exclusivity,
and FDA pointed to other instances where the agency had approved waivers and
transfers with respect to five-year and three-year exclusivity under the Hatch-
Waxman amendments.'33 The court concluded that FDA's interpretation of the
statute was not based on an impermissible construction of the statute, was neither
arbitrary nor capricious, and was not an abuse of discretion."4 It therefore denied
emergency relief.
FDA restated its position that 180-day exclusivity rights are transferable in pro-
posed regulations published in 1999,135 and it has continued to approve ANDAs
filed by applicants who have acquired the exclusivity rights of the first to file.136
130 Ranbaxy v. Leavitt, No. 06-5154 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 14, 2006); see also FDA Loses in Court on
Delisting Patents, DICKINSON'S FDA WEBVIEW (Nov. 14, 2006). While the appeal was pending, Sandoz,
which also sought to market generic simvastatin, separately challenged FDA's relisting of the patents
in the Orange Book and its requirement that all pending ANDAs be updated with either a paragraph
III certification or a paragraph IV certification to each patent. The district court denied its motion for
a preliminary injunction, and the court of appeals summarily affirmed. See Sandoz v. Food and Drug
Administration, 439 F.Supp.2d 26 (D.D.C. 2006), affd 2006 WL 2591087 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (unpublished).
The district court noted that "FDA's refusal to give final approval to Sandoz's simvastatin application
until Ivax and Ranbaxy have exhausted their 180 days of exclusivity is not a discretionary act to be
reviewed again, but was compelled by [the] decision in Ranbaxy." Id at 30. It also rejected the only new
argument made by Sandoz-that it was not required to update its ANDA with respect to the relisted
patents-as inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and regulations. Id at 31.
131 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(CC).
132 Boehringer Ingelheim Corp. v. Shalala, 993 ESupp.1 (D.D.C. 1997).
133 993 F.Supp. at 2.
134 Id.
'3' 64 Fed. Reg. 42873, 42881 (Aug. 6, 1999).
" See Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study (July 2002), at 36 ("For 6
out of 68 drug products in which there was more than one generic applicant, the first and second generic
applicant entered into agreements related to generic market entry. In 4 of these agreements, one of the
main provisions specified which generic applicant had or retained rights to the 180-day exclusivity"); id
("In I agreement, the first generic applicant relinquished its rights to 180-day exclusivity for a $35 million
license and royalty payment based on the second generic applicant's sales for a period of 7 years.").
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The court that decided the terazosin case (Mylan I) in 2000 also confirmed that
exclusivity may be transferred separately from the ANDA, writing that "[e]xclusivity
periods are a transferable commodity which can be waived in favor of another
generic manufacturer for a substantial price." '137
FDA addressed transfer in the regulations it proposed in 1999.138 Under one
part of this proposal, once a subsequent generic received tentative approval for its
generic drug from FDA (such that the exclusivity was the only obstacle it faced for
final approval), a triggering period would begin to run.I39 Within 180 days, one of
the two triggering events-a favorable court decision regarding the patent or com-
mercial marketing by the first applicant-would need to occur, or the first generic
would lose its exclusivity. 4° After a triggering event, the first generic would have
been permitted to transfer its rights to another company. ' 4' FDA noted that transfer
can be particularly useful when a subsequent generic wins its patent suit with the
pioneer before the first generic's suit goes to trial. 142 Prior to the triggering event,
however, the first generic would not have been permitted to transfer its exclusivity
rights. It could relinquish its rights-waive its exclusivity entirely-permitting FDA
to approve all subsequent ANDAs, but it could not waive its rights in favor of a
particular generic manufacturer (i.e., sell its rights).
Although FDA withdrew its proposed regulations in 2002, in 2004 the agency
made it clear that it would continue to require a triggering event to distinguish
between relinquishment and selective waiver of exclusivity. On May 11, 2004,
Pfizer submitted a citizen petition to FDA asking the agency to "acknowledge"
that 180-day exclusivity cannot lawfully be waived or transferred. 43 Pfizer argued,
among other things, that the plain language of the statute does not permit waiver
or transfer, and that permitting exclusivity to be fully alienable encourages ANDA
applicants to file weak applications simply to vest a lucrative asset. On July 2, 2004,
the agency denied that citizen petition. 144 FDA rejected the textual argument on the
ground that section 505(j)(5)(B)(iv) is ambiguous and can reasonably be interpreted
to permit waiver. Further, the agency added, the statute confers a private benefit
to specific entities, and in such situations judicial precedent supports inferring
that the agency may allow an alternative course of action more favorable to the
beneficiary. Finally, the agency noted, allowing generic applicants to waive their
exclusivity promotes competition by enabling other generic applicants to market
their products sooner. FDA's response makes it clear that the agency continues
to require a triggering event in order to distinguish between relinquishment and
selective waiver. "As to potential 'gaming,' if the first applicant could selectively
waive [transfer] its exclusivity at any time," FDA wrote, the agency "could reason-
ably expect the development of a 'market' for 180-day exclusivity, with a resulting
increase in ANDA's submitted solely to claim exclusivity." FDA concluded, however,
"that by permitting selective waiver [transfer] only once the exclusivity is triggered,
it can prevent 'gaming' of exclusivity, avoid unnecessary exclusivity disputes, and
still maintain exclusivity as an adequate incentive and reward.' ' 45
'3' Id. at 42.
' 64 Fed. Reg. 42873 (Aug. 6, 1999).
139 Id. at 42878.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 42881.
142 Id.
141 Pfizer, Inc., Citizen Petition, 2004P-0227 (May 11, 2004).
'4 FDA, Response to Pfizer Citizen Petition, 2004P-0227 (July 2, 2004).
141 Id. at n. 5.
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I. Does 180-day Exclusivity "Roll Over" to Second ANDA Applicant
in the Event the First Applicant Does Not Perfect Its Rights?
No. In FDA's August 1999 draft regulations, the agency confirmed its view that ex-
clusivity would not roll over to a second applicant, even if the first applicant withdrew
its ANDA. Although these regulations were not finalized, this has been FDA's policy
since the proposal issued. The amended legislation requires this result as well.
Prior to 1999, there were no cases or official FDA pronouncements on the
question whether exclusivity might "roll over" to a second applicant, although
the agency did note in 1994 that if the first applicant was "not actively pursuing
approval" of its ANDA, FDA would make approval of subsequent ANDAs im-
mediately effective.146 It did not address the question whether the next applicant
would receive exclusivity. Five years later, it addressed the issue. FDAs August 1999
proposed regulations stated that, in order to be entitled to 180-day exclusivity, an
ANDA applicant must be the first to file a substantially complete ANDA with a
paragraph IV certification.147 An ANDA was not substantially complete if FDA
determined that the required bioequivalence data failed to meet FDA standards. If
FDA found the bioequivalence studies to be deficient, that applicant would lose its
exclusivity, and no other applicant would be granted exclusivity. FDA noted that,
as this suggests, there would be no "rolling exclusivity."' 48 Thus, for example, if the
first generic withdrew its application, no subsequent applicant would be granted
exclusivity. If the first generic did not perfect its right to the 180-day period (for
example, if it lost the patent infringement case), exclusivity would not roll over to
the next-filed ANDA.
The 2003 legislation requires the same result for new ANDAs: if all first appli-
cants forfeit exclusivity, "no applicant shall be eligible."' 149
J. Will Marketing by First Generic of Pioneer's Product under
Private Generic Label Satisfy Commercial Marketing Trigger?
FDA decided that private label sales could constitute commercial marketing in 2001,
and this was upheld by afederal court in West Virginia. Congress confirmed this in 2003
for new ANDAs with the addition of the words "including the commercial marketing
of the listed drug" in the sentence describing the commercial marketing trigger
In a case involving generic copies of Procardia XL (nifedipine), a district court
in West Virginia upheld FDA's determination that a generic manufacturer begins
commercial marketing and thereby starts the 180-day clock even when it sells a
private label version of the innovator's product, rather than the product that is
the subject of its ANDA.'50 In April 1997, Mylan submitted an ANDA with a
paragraph IV certification to the 30 mg dosage. It was, therefore, the first generic.
The pioneer, Pfizer, sued Mylan, for infringement, and the parties settled in Feb-
ruary 2000. Although the settlement terms were not made public or given to the
court, the court stated that Pfizer apparently licensed Mylan to sell a private label
146 59 Fed. Reg. at 50367-50368.
117 64 Fed. Reg. 42873 (Aug. 6, 1999).
141 Id. at 42873.
149 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(III).
I" Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 207 F.Supp.2d 476 (N.D. WVa. 2001).
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version of its own 30 mg, 60 mg, and 90 mg nifedipine products. Pfizer may also
have permitted Mylan to market its own 30 mg product under its own ANDA,
but Mylan never did so. Mylan claimed the settlement allowed it to maintain its
paragraph IV certification, and it never amended the paragraph IV certification
to a paragraph III. After the settlement, Biovail, a generic manufacturer aspiring
to market nifedipine, attempted without success to persuade Mylan to waive its
180-day exclusivity. When this failed, Teva (its licensee) submitted a citizen petition
to FDA asking the agency to find either a) the Mylan ANDA was not eligible for
exclusivity, or b) any exclusivity had expired. FDA responded in February 2001,
agreeing on both grounds. The agency reasoned, first, that the settlement effectively
turned Mylan's paragraph IV certification into a paragraph III certification, and
second, that the private label sales constituted commercial marketing and triggered
exclusivity. Because the 180 days had expired, FDA approved Biovail's ANDA.
Mylan brought suit.
In the decision that resulted, the district court found that FDA had been unrea-
sonable on the first issue and reasonable on the second. The court was not prepared
to allow FDA unilaterally to deem the paragraph IV certification to be a paragraph
III certification, particularly since Mylan had not amended the certification in its
ANDA. But it upheld FDA's determination that the private label sales were com-
mercial marketing, and thus the 180-day period had expired.
The 2003 amendments were consistent with this decision. Congress provided that
if an ANDA contains a paragraph IV certification and "is for a drug for which a
first applicant has submitted an application containing such a certification" (i.e., is
for a drug for which someone else submitted an ANDA earning it exclusivity) the
application "shall be made effective on the date that is 180 days after the date of
the first commercial marketing of the drug (including the commercial marketing
of the listed drug) by any first applicant.' 51
K. Does an ANDA Applicant's 180-Day Exclusivity Preclude an
Innovator from Distributing an 'Authorized Generic" Version
of its Drug?
No. The statute does not prohibit the holder of an approved NDA from marketing an
authorized generic during the exclusivity period
In a citizen petition filed in February 2004, Mylan Pharmaceuticals argued that
authorized generics are "generic" drugs and, therefore, subject to (may not be mar-
keted during) the exclusivity period awarded to the first generic applicant. 5 2 The
company also argued that the "emerging trend" of marketing authorized generics
"will negatively affect the incentive given to generic manufactures to challenge drug
patents." 53 Teva Pharmaceuticals submitted a similar citizen petition in June 2004,
regarding an authorized generic of Pfizer's Accupril (quinapril hydrochloride).'54 On
July 2, FDA denied both petitions.'55 Among other things, the agency wrote that,
"FDA does not regulate drug prices and has no legal basis on which to prevent an
151 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).
152 Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Citizen Petition, 2004P-0075 (Feb. 17, 2004).
M" Id. at 2.
'54 Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Citizen Petition, 2004P-0261 (June 9, 2004).
155 FDA, Response to Teva and Mylan Citizen Petitions, 2004P-0075 and 2004P-0261 (July 2,
2004).
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innovator company from marketing its approved NDA product at a price that is
competitive with that charged by a first generic applicant to the market." '56
Teva filed suit against FDA seeking review of FDA's denial of its citizen petition.
It later amended its complaint to name Pfizer and its subsidiary Greenstone as
defendants, seeking to enjoin the launch of a generic version of Pfizer's Neurontin
(gabapentin) by Greenstone. In an oral ruling following launch by Greenstone, the
court denied Teva's motion for a temporary restraining order. The district court
granted summary judgment for FDA and Pfizer in December 2004,1' and the D.C.
Circuit affirmed in June 2005, noting that the statute "clearly does not prohibit
the holder of an approved NDA from marketing, during the 180-day exclusivity
period, its own 'brand-generic' version of its drug."'58
Mylan also brought suit, with the same result. The Mylan case involved a generic
version of Procter & Gamble's Macrobid (nitrofurantoin), which is used to treat
urinary tract infections. FDA approved Mylan's application on March 22,2004, and
the company began to market the product on March 23. On the same day, Watson
Pharmaceuticals began to sell an authorized generic under a license from Procter
& Gamble. Mylan had filed its citizen petition (discussed above) in anticipation of
this authorized generic, and once FDA denied the citizen petition, the company
filed suit against the agency in the Northern District of West Virginia.159 Later the
same month, shortly after oral argument, it withdrew the suit. 16° Three months
later, it filed the suit again, and in September 2005, the district court dismissed
Mylan's complaint for failure to state a claim. The Fourth Circuit affirmed in July
2006 that FDA lacks the power to prohibit the marketing of authorized generics
during the 180-day exclusivity period.1 6'
116 Id at 2.
157 Teva Pharms Indus. v. Crawford, 355 F.Supp.2d IIl (D.D.C. 2004).
158 Teva Pharm. Indus. v. Crawford, 410 E3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
159 Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Food and Drug Administration, Case No. 1:04cv174 (N.D.
WVa., filed Aug. 4, 2004).
160 Notice of Voluntary Dismissal without Prejudice, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Food and
Drug Administration, Case No. 1:04cv 174 (N.D. WVa., Aug. 30, 2004). Trade press reported that "[tihe
judge seemed to indicate that Mylan might not be able to get FDA to act under the FDC Act because
the law is silent on the issue." Mylan Drops Authorized Generics Suit Against FDA, INSIDE WASHINGTON'S
FDA WEEK, (Sept. 3, 2004), at 2.
161 Mylan v. FDA, 454 F3d 270 (4th Cir. 2006). See Mylan Loses Fight Against Agency: Court
Says Authorized Generics Policy Legal, BNA INC. PHARMACEUTICAL LAW & INDUSTRY (July 14, 2006).
Legislation was, however, introduced in both houses during the 109th Congress apparently intending
to prohibit the practice. See S. 3695 (109th Cong.); H.R. 5993 (109th Cong.). The Senate bill was
referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions. The House bill was referred to
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health. Neither bill passed out of
Committee before the end of the Congress. Congress also included a provision in the Deficit Reduction
Act of 2005 requiring that, after Jan. 1, 2007, average manufacturer price (AMP) and best price include
all drugs marketed under a single NDA. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171. And at
the request of Senators Grassley, Leahy, and Rockefeller, the FTC is examining the competitive effect
of authorized generics. See Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Authorized Generic
Pharmaceuticals: Effects on Innovation (Aug. 8, 2006) (CRS Report), at 16; see also Grassley, Other
Senators Want FTC Study on Market Effects of 'Authorized Generics," BNA INC. PHARMACEUTICAL LAW
& INDUSTRY (May 20,2005). This report should be released in 2007. FTC Press Release, "FTC Proposes
Study of Competitive Impacts of Authorized Generic Drugs) (March 29,2006) ("With OMB approval,
the Commission will likely issue the orders later this year, and prepare a final report in 2007."); see also
CRS Report, supra, at 16; 71 Fed. Reg. 16779 (Apr. 4, 2006). The HHS Office of Inspector General
(OIG) also recently announced a study of the impact of authorized generics on Medicaid drug pricing
and rebates. See CRS Report, at 16.
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L. Do 180-Day Exclusivity and Pediatric Exclusivity Run Concurrently
or Consecutively?
If a pioneer earns six months of pediatric exclusivity, the first generic applicant's
ANDA is approved effective the first day after conclusion of that exclusivity, and the
180 days begin to run at that point. The terms are consecutive.
In May 2001, FDA sought public comment on whether pediatric exclusivity for
an innovator runs concurrently or consecutively with 180-day exclusivity for the
first generic. 6 2 The agency evidently believed that the two exclusivity provisions
run concurrently.'63 At least one generic manufacturer challenged this assertion.
Barr was the first generic for Lilly's Prozac. A district court found infringement,
but the Federal Circuit reversed and held the second of two challenged patents
invalid, while upholding the first. 164 The upheld patent was not set to expire until
February 2001, followed by an additional six months of pediatric exclusivity Had
the appellate court ordered the district court to enter a judgment of invalidity on
the second patent in September 2000, Barr's exclusivity would have started to run
and would have expired before Lilly's pediatric exclusivity was due to expire. Barr
prepared to challenge FDXs interpretation, but it turned out never to be necessary.
The timing of the Federal Circuit's denial of a petition for rehearing and the district
court's resulting judgment of invalidity (triggering Barr's 180 days) was such that
pediatric exclusivity had already expired.
The issue was resolved by Congress, however, in the Best Pharmaceuticals for
Children Act (BPCA).65 In this legislation, Congress added section 505A(k) to the
FDCA, which states that 180-day exclusivity does not begin until an innovator's
pediatric exclusivity has expired. This ensures that generic drug manufacturers
entitled to 180-day exclusivity do not lose a portion of that exclusivity due to the
overlap with the innovator's pediatric exclusivity.'66
IV. CONCLUSION
It is impossible to predict all of the interpretive issues that will arise with respect
to the 2003 exclusivity provisions. One would expect that issues would arise as FDA
interprets the amendments. It would appear likely because of their complexity that
the forfeiture provisions will be a focus of considerable litigation. To date, however,
no exclusivity terms have been forfeited even though the provisions could apply to
some products, especially given that it has been well over 30 months since passage
of the 2003 amendments. Citizen petitions filed at the agency since 2003 continue
for the most part to invoke the old rules, although-as discussed earlier-two
petitions have argued that Congress meant to overrule the FDA policy at issue in
the metformin case (see section 111-A, above) and that under the amended rules,
therefore, the date notice of a paragraph IV certification is provided to the innovator
controls for exclusivity purposes, whether the paragraph IV certification is included
in an original ANDA or added as an amendment to a pending ANDA. 1'67
162 66 Fed. Reg. 27983 (May 21, 2001).
161 See [THE PINK SHEET] (Mar. 12, 2001), at 3.
"4 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories Inc., 222 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
165 Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002).
'6 Pediatric exclusivity is due for reauthorization in 2007.
167 See Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Citizen Petition, Docket No. 2006P-0245 (June 12, 2006)
(pending); IVAX, Citizen Petition, Docket No. 2004P-0520 (Nov. 19, 2004) (withdrawn).

